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PANEL DISCUSSION: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THE
IMPACT OF SARBANES-OXLEY"
MODERATOR: JOHN STEPHENSON, ESQ-0
PANELISTS: LIC. JOSt 0. GARCIA MATA, LIC. THOMAS HEATHER

JAIME CORTIES ROCI'A:' I would like to comment on Don Jos6 Garcfa Mata's

remarks about the Comisario.2 Although I acknowledge and appreciate the high

responsibilities which the post carries, I think the Comisario plays a very important
role in the protection of shareholders before and against the acts of management, the
administration, and against controlling shareholders. I think its protections are
especially beneficial to non-public companies. Public companies already have some
protections for minorities and have implemented some corporate governance rules. 3
However, if you look at the general companies that constitute approximately 99%
of the businesses in Mexico, they need some sort of protection from management
that is not currently given by the law.
Also, the work of the comisarios is not the same as the role of the auditors.
Comisariosrespond to the shareholders and not to the board. In cases where there
is an auditing committee, the board appoints the auditor based on the
recommendation of the audit committee. The responsibilities of the comisario,in
terms of reporting financial information, include assisting the shareholders by
calling for shareholder meetings. The comisarioshave a general role of inspection
and reporting which is not given to the auditors. Although the post of comisario
originated with the Law of General Corporations more than sixty years ago, it is still
a valid role and should perhaps be revised. It could be looked upon differently in
its application to public companies that are currently subject to corporate
governance rules. In general terms, I think this is a role that should continue in
Mexican corporations.
STEPHENSON: Does anyone on the panel want to respond?
JOSti 0. GARCIA MATA: In my prior comments I tried to emphasize that, as
presently written, the law imposes significant personal responsibility on a person
who serves as comisario,or statutory examiner. I just cannot see how someone who
does not participate in or has the support of an audit can render a report that states
that the information presented by management to shareholders reflects in a true and
sufficient form the financial position and results of operations of the corporation.
That, to me, is a statement that implies a great deal of responsibility. I am no longer
the comisario of any company and that is a personal decision. I do not get involved
with any audit in particular. I agree that the comisario function is particularly for
non-public, or private companies. For instance, it can be a very useful tool for
overseeing the interests of minority shareholders and of family members. I think it
is a valid role. I do, however, think that the law and its requirements should be
* The views expressed here are those of the panelists, and should not be taken to represent the views of

their employers or other organizations with whom they may be affiliated.
** A summary of the panelists' background appears on the last page of the panel discussion.
1. Jaime Cort6s is a partner in the firm of Mijares, Angoitea, Cortes y Fuentes S.C. in Mexico City.
2. Supra p. 49. Jos Garcia Mata ChangingRole of Mexican Accounting Firmsand of the Comisario, and
Response to the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002.
3. Id.
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revised. Comisariosshould not be required to make such a broad statement as they
must under current law.
CORTIS: The comisarios usually rely on the work of an auditing firm.
Customarily, the comisario is a partner of the same auditing firm, but that does not
mean that it has to be in the same auditing firm. However, I do not understand
anyone accepting the responsibility of comisarioif there is no auditing firm making
the financial audit. Likewise, the comisariocould ask to be staffed and the company
would pay those expenses. In my experience, most instances where comisarioshave
been sued for responsibility are due to the comisarios taking sides with one of the
groups of the company.
STEPHENSON: I had a firm tell me that it no longer acts as comisario. They will
act only as an accountant and perform an audit for the firm, but neither they nor any
of their partners are permitted to act as comisarios. I was informed of this practice
about a year ago.
THOMAS HEATHER: It is interesting, I think very valid points are being made
here. The comment that has been made by your client is based on the fact that we
have disputes that can go wrong, especially with shareholders. The comisario has
a valid function, a very important function, to try to get the parties together, to call
shareholders meetings, and to assure the formalities are kept.
Unfortunately in Mexico we are seeing that when the comisariobrings the parties
together, mercantile and commercial matters are turned into criminal affairs. First,
litigators cause arrest warrants to be issued, comisarios are placed in jail, and then
they ask you whether the convocatoria or agenda was correct or not. We find this
tendency to file criminal charges as a means of pressure to be a problem, especially
with the smaller companies. People do not want to take that role anymore, so now
we are seeing that many non-accountants, or friends of management, end up in that
role.
MICHAEL OWEN: 4 I'm going to agree with and challenge some comments that
both Jaime and Jos6 have made. Jos6's partner got squeezed not because he took
sides but because, under Mexican law, he was required to call a shareholders
meeting. That company had not called a shareholders meeting in two years, and a
valid shareholder was insisting that the comisario call a shareholders meeting. I do
not think that is taking sides, and yet that partner was threatened with criminal
action and had to take a very long vacation outside of Mexico. But I do take issue
with Jos6's comments to a large extent with respect to the comisario. In fact, I have
often felt that one of the very valuable elements of Mexican corporate law as
compared to U.S. law is precisely the institution of the comisario. It is especially
valuable in Mexico, where certain families control many companies. These families
give little or no importance to the rights of the minority shareholders. In that
scenario, the comisario can play a very valuable role. I do happen to agree with

4. Michael Owen is a partner in the firm of Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker L.L.P. in Los Angeles,
California.
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Jose's comment with respect to certification on the accounting side. If the comisario
is not an accountant or the accountant is not competent the comisario should not be
required to make that certification. The comisario'sresponsibilities with respect to
calling shareholders meeting and assuring that corporate formalities are followed on
behalf of the shareholders are extremely valuable ones.
CARLOS RAMOS:5 I wanted to comment on the fact that the statutory auditor or
the comisario is not the only one held personally liable under the commercial
companies law. There are also several provisions affecting direct liability and
personal liability for directors. We have to revisit the actual corporate culture in
Mexico. Some companies appoint a statutory auditor and appoint directors, but
neither the statutory auditor nor the directors take their office seriously. We have
to revisit our practices and then we have to learn to be liable and responsible for our
actions. If we agree to be on a board, we must act as board members as required by
law. Thus we will have to spend money to pay real professionals for undertaking
those jobs, even though corporate governance is going to be much more expensive
and we all have to take a step toward being more responsible for our actions.
JOHN ROGERS:' Regarding the comisario's legal liability, we already talked
about the criminal liability. What about civil liability for damages caused to
creditors of a company that has either borrowed money or issued securities and the
financial condition of the company has rapidly deteriorated in a manner that would
suggest that the comisario should have known and should have taken more
aggressive action to make the real condition of the company known?
My second question involves the reporting-up obligation for lawyers in the U.S.
under section 307 of Sarbanes-Oxley7 and its applicability to foreign attorneys. In
this case foreign attorneys can include Mexican issuers in the U.S. capital market.
As I understand it, the exemption for foreign attorneys is not a blanket exemption.
It is only an exemption to the extent that the foreign attorney does not hold himself
or herself out as practicing and does not give legal advice regarding U.S. federal or
state securities or other laws. The question I raise is, for a Mexican attorney who
is advising a Mexican issuer in the U.S. capital markets, how easy is it to draw the
line and say you're not advising on U.S. securities laws?
HEATHER: You are right. It's not a blanket exemption and perhaps I am not well
qualified to address the questions from the U.S. perspective, since I do not practice
law in the U.S. In any event, I believe there is an implied duty of care by the
Mexican lawyer. He renders advice in those areas where he is competent, and he
should be very careful to know when to rely on U.S. counsel. There are certain
matters that do have a consequence and it is important to document whatever the
lawyer relies on when rendering advice in regard to U.S. placements.

5.
6.
7.
§ 307, 116

Carlos Ramos is a partner in the firm of Barrera, Siqueros y Tortes Landa S.C. in Mexico City.
John Rogers is a partner in the firm of Strasburger & Price, L.L.P. in Mexico City.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Rules of Professional Responsibility for Attorneys, Pub. L. No. 107-204,
Stat. 745 (2002).
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As far as the comisario is concerned, we must refer to the 1934 Mexican Statute on
Corporations Law or the Ley Generalde Sociedades Mercantiles.8 It is possible for
a shareholder, or in some circumstances a creditor, to sustain the auditor or declare
that the comisario approved securities certifications improperly or erroneously,
causing damage. The certifications could also be plainly false. The problem is that
the standards of evidence are extremely high, and furthermore you have to establish
the direct causal link for damages in our Mexican legal system. The possibility of
actually recouping damages or lost profits, perjuicios, is a very difficult task. It is
probably not worthwhile to attempt to recoup damages unless it is something
absolutely blatant, and that is never the case.
There have been instances under U.S. securities laws of alleged violations of SEC
Rule 10-B-5 9 where an auditor or officer of an issuer knowingly omits a material
fact or should have known of actions or discussions of relevance which were
omitted in disclosure. Any time you have a situation where civil liability is
predicated exclusively on a violation of U.S. securities law, even if a judgment is
obtained and is subsequently brought to Mexico for enforcement through the
Mexican judiciary, the case will be severely questioned and probably will not get
past first base.
KIMBERLY WARNKE: 0 I know this was a tangential sort of issue raised by Lic.
Heather, but I wanted to pursue it because it interests or troubles me. With regard
to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA)," the Facilitating Payment Concept,
or "grease payment" as they're otherwise called, I understand that those are an
exception under the FCPA. I also understand that "grease payments" are limited to
the extent that local law prohibits them. Further, it is my understanding that in
Mexico, local law does in fact prohibit them. It is also my understanding that we are
dealing with a climate where we may believe, or suspect, that they are more
common in practice, whether or not they are legally prohibited. How do you
suggest advising clients with regard to that discrepancy, if you will, between reality
and legal obligations?
HEATHER: Basically you are correct. Many of these payments to a government
official or employee to carry out their function are considered to be a felony.
Mexico, in order to be in compliance with the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) Convention on the Prevention of Bribery
in Foreign Officials, 2 reformed an article in the Federal Criminal Code, Article 222
(C6digo Penal Federal). You would probably have as a general rule, that some of
the conduct does violate Mexican law. Nevertheless, there are certain exceptions,
and some could be administrative violations. There are limitations as to amounts,

8.

LEY GENERAL DE SOCIEDADES MERCANTILES, available at http://www.bibliojuridica.org/libros/libro

.html=268.
9. Civil liability under §10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), commonly
referred to as Securities and Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5.
10. Kimberly Warkc is a partner in the firm of Strasburger & Price, LLP in Mexico City.
11. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, §§ 102-04, 91 Stat. 1494 (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (2004)).
12. Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions,
Dec. 17, 1997, 337 I.L.M. 8, available at http://www.oecd.org./daf/cmis/bribery/ 20nov23.htm.
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there are limitations as to gifts; allowable, legal gifts may be fairly small. But the
FCPA, under the light of Sarbanes-Oxley, has caused a major problem. Consider
the situation in regard to resolving an issue with intellectual property piracy, either
with software or other consumer products, or counterfeit products and stolen parts.
You have an administrative party that is the IMPI, the Mexican Institute of
Intellectual Property, and then you have the PGR, which is the Attorney General's
Office that prosecutes criminal felonies for contraband and piracy. In order to file
and make either one of these entities move and actually carry out raids, they may not
have the budget or the equipment available to carry out surveillance or to even
transport the agents to a remote location. However, if the company provides
resources and pays for some of the agency's expenses and this agreement is strictly
documented, is that a violation? I would say probably not. Yet certain colleagues
in the states may say "No, that is the violation."
Consider an Agencia Federalde Investigacidn (AFI) raid. AFI is the Mexican
equivalent of the FBI. I believe they are doing a marvelous job and they are honest
and young, well-trained people. Sometimes when they have to travel they might ask
you, "Could you cover my lunch?" Some people may charge you up to, U.S. $20
a day. Is that a violation of a statute? I would say probably not. But it is something
that is recurring and we have to take a look at the specific circumstances. This is not
a problem unique to Mexico.
Yet, I do not think I quite answered your question sufficiently, but hopefully, I
have given you a few points for further thought. I believe you have to look at FCPA
questions on a case-by-case basis. Any type of bribery always poses serious issues.
STEPHENSON: Additional questions?
CHARLES BELL: " Extrapolating this further down, from the attorney-reportingup perspective, I speak from the perspective of an in-house lawyer who has a
Mexican subsidiary. I would certainly want local counsel reporting those kinds of
issues up through the general counsel's office of the parent company. I realize that
may create some confidentiality issues that I know our company would be more than
happy to help you resolve with respect to our subsidiaries. I was just wondering
about your thoughts on that in terms of the question that another gentleman asked,
"Who is your client?," when representing multi-national corporations, and you're
primarily representing the local subsidiary?
HEATHER: Who is your client? Your client could be the Mexican subsidiaryusually the case-or it could be the multi-national. It also depends on how you
establish the contact and who pays you. Often reports from external counsel go
directly to the general counsel's office in the foreign company or the assistant
general counsel in charge of the region or in charge of Mexico. That is up at the
parent level. In general, Mexican practitioners in serious corporate firms are very
careful in establishing the formality of who is the actual client.
In general, we have well established practices in Mexico to determine who the
client is and when it may be appropriate to report or not with respect to a situation.

13. Mr. Bell is an employee of Perot Systems Corporation in Piano, Texas.
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Sometimes it is appropriate to report even though the local persons in the legal
department are your friends. You have a duty first to carry out your engagement on
the agreed terms. In most cases, the client is the multinational, and the attorney
reports to the head office.
One thing that is happening is that many of these multi-nationals go outside their
established relationship of many years when these issues come up. They go to
another law firm so that you do not cause the attorney, or law firm in question, to
have to address these issues or cause a conflict unnecessarily. These issues are
handled very confidentially, and I think we are seeing more clients consulting other
firms and vice versa.
BELL: I think that applies not only when you have specific violations of law but
also of the materiality standards under the securities regulations for public
companies, particularly for smaller public companies. Relatively modest amounts
of money could create a reporting issue for the parent, so it is probably incumbent
upon all counsel to really understand materiality standards so that a local problem
doesn't end up being a material violation at the securities law level.
HEA-THER: One very interesting point that came out of WorldCom specifically
was this Breeden Report.' 4 I do not know if you have read it, but it is
comprehensive and it does not allow anybody to do anything. And basically I really
doubt that the Pope would qualify as an external, as the comisario. Is this going
way beyond Sarbanes-Oxley as a reaction regarding fiduciary duties?
In Mexico we have concepts of fiduciary duties similar to those of the SEC and
those imposed by Sarbanes-Oxley. First of all, directors in Mexican corporations are
bound by a general duty of care and loyalty. The Civil Code applies supplementary
to the Mercantile Code, and is an obligation of prudence to keep the business or take
care of it as if it were one's own (negocios propios). That basic concept is
imbedded in the Civil Code, and also there are standards within other provisions of
Mexican law.
Second, we are finding that more public companies in Mexico are implementing
principles and internal policies basically dealing with conflicts of interest and
business opportunities. Nevertheless, it is a fact that in Mexico we have a very
heavy concentration of wealth, and few persons on many boards, like the one fellow
that is on ten boards and has access to significant business opportunities. It would
be an issue if policies were violated or if there was an obvious conflict of interest or
violation of this duty of care and prudence. I believe you would have standing to
report it, but to whom? You report it to the board and you would say, "There's been
a breach of this internal policy." You report it to the audit committee. The audit
committee should and must give the proper follow-through on these policies to
make sure they are being implemented, and not just prescribed on paper.
If an opportunity is lost it is possible for the audit committee to recover damages.
However, my principal comment on the issue of damages, is that in theory you can
14. Richard C. Breeden, Restoring Trust: CorporateGovernanceforthe Future ofMC!, Inc., Aug. 26,2003.
Mr. Breeden is the court-appointed corporate monitor for WorldCom Inc. The report details the 78 corporate
governance recommendations for MCI WorldCom. The recommendations include new rules for director selection,
board operations, and limits on executive compensation.
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recover damages and lost profits. However, in most cases, whatever is recouped is
for the benefit of the corporation, not for the benefit of who ever is suing, which
does away with "derivative"-type suits. The technical problem is one of
substantiating the evidence and establishing very clearly a direct cause and effect.
In the courts that is a real problem. In fact, I'm not aware of any major lawsuit
whatsoever that has been successful using this theory.
ROGERS: I would like to take issue with the suggestion in the situations where
there is a foreign parent company and a Mexican subsidiary, that lawyers should
treat both as our clients. I think that creates a potential problem in blurring
responsibility. There are some cases where the U.S. parent does not wholly own the
subsidiary; there may be local shareholders. Even if there are not significant local
shareholders, it may create a suggestion that there is some duty where there is a
conflict to side with maybe one of the parties or get a conflict waiver from the two.
I am not sure that is necessarily a good thing to do.
HEATHER: I agree with what you say; that should be the case. You have to know
who your client is and what you were hired for. You have to be very careful with
your letter of engagement. There could be a situation where you are hired for a
project and that project involved the participation of the parent and of the subsidiary,
and there could be a conflict. I believe in that situation, you are ethically obligated
to not represent either one and to withdraw from the matter.
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